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Focused Discussion Invited Paper
The Relevance of Evidence from the History of
Science in the Contemporary
Realism/Anti-realism Debate*
K. Brad Wray†
I aim to clarify the relevance of evidence from the history of science to
the contemporary realism/anti-realism debate as the need for evidence from
the history of science is often misunderstood or misrepresented.
First, consider the role of evidence from the history of science in
anti-realist arguments. In particular, consider the role of evidence from
the history of science in one version of the Pessimistic Induction. Some
anti-realists (allegedly) appeal to the history of science in an effort to
construct an enumerative induction to support the conclusion that today’s
best theories, despite their many explanatory and predictive successes, are
likely to be discarded in the future. Following the straight rule of induction,
this sort of anti-realist (allegedly) argues that most past successful theories
have since been discarded and replaced by different theories that make
radically different assumptions about the nature of reality. Thus, the history
of science is not, as many realists argue, a steady progression of modified
theories that (i) retain the successes of past theories, and (ii) explain the
successes of earlier theories by appeal to the same sorts of mechanisms and
entities posited by earlier theories. Absent some distinguishing feature that
would make contemporary successful theories less prone to being discarded
than their predecessors, it seems there are good inductive grounds for
believing that our contemporary theories will also be discarded in the
future and replaced by theories that make radically different ontological
assumptions about unobservable aspects of reality (Putnam 1975; Wray
2015).
The Pessimistic Induction has been criticized on a number of grounds.
Some critics claim that it commits some sort of fallacy, either the Base
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Rate Fallacy, the Turnover Fallacy, or the False Positives Fallacy (Magnus
and Callender 2004; Lange 2002; Lewis 2001). Others have taken issue with
particular cases of discarded theories that have figured in the debate, cases
allegedly supporting the anti-realists’ enumerative induction. These critics
argue that specific theories that anti-realists identified as successful but
false were either (i) successful and approximately true, or (ii) unsuccessful,
and hence incapable of supporting the anti-realists’ induction (Harden and
Rosenberg 1982; and Psillos 1996).1
Setting the concerns about the Pessimistic Induction aside, I believe that
realists have exaggerated the anti-realists’ need for evidence. Any radical
change of theory in a field threatens to undermine the realist’s claim that
changes of theory generally preserve the successes of the theories they replace
by appeal to the same mechanisms and entities. Any discontinuities that are
caused by radical theory changes threaten scientific realism, or at least certain
forms of realism. Thus, an enumerative induction is unnecessary.
What is the relevance of evidence from the history of science to the
realists’ arguments? Realists have been less than transparent about their
appeals to evidence from the history of science. But many realists claim that
various theoretical values or virtues, such as simplicity, breadth of scope,
etc., are correlated with theoretical truth. That is, theories that embody
these virtues are more likely true than not (McMullin 1993).
The claims to the effect that simplicity or breadth of scope is correlated
with theoretical truth are empirical claims, and thus require evidence in
their support. One way to justify such claims is by appeal to an inductive
argument. But realists have not provided evidence gathered systematically
from the history of science to support claims such as: (i) simple theories are
likely true or approximately true, or (ii) theories broad in scope are likely true
or approximately true. Instead, many realists seem dogmatically to assume
the alleged connection is beyond dispute. I take issue with this assumption.
There is an alternative route to justifying these sorts of methodological
claims. The realist might take a Popperian attitude toward these
methodological claims about the relationship between the theoretical values
and theoretical truth. The realist might hypothesize such a link, and be open
to rejecting it, if the evidence suggests otherwise. Clearly, there have been
many cases in the history of science where a simpler theory was inferior to
a more complex theory or a theory broad in scope was inferior to a theory
that was narrower in scope. Confronted with such cases, the realist need not
wholly reject her methodological claims. The realist could refine the claims,
specifying, for example, under what specific conditions a simple theory is
1 Laudan (1981) provides the definitive list of theories that are alleged to be successful
but false.
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more likely true than a more complex theory. This revised methodological
hypothesis would then be subjected to testing. But realists have not pursued
this strategy, at least not in any systematic way.
It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on
evidence from the history of science. But I have argued here that (i) realists
have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science
to support their methodological claims, and (ii) anti-realists do not rely on
evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.
K. Brad Wray









Hardin, Clyde L., and Alexander Rosenberg. 1982. In Defense of Convergent
Realism. Philosophy of Science 49(4): 604-615.
Lange, Marc. 2002. Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions, and the Turnover Fallacy.
Analysis 62(4): 281-285.
Laudan, Larry. 1981. A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science
48(1): 19-49.
Lewis, Peter J. 2001. Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy. Synthese 129(3):
371-380.
Magnus, P. D., and Craig Callender. 2004. Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.
Philosophy of Science 71(3): 320-338.
McMullin, Ernan. 1993. Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science. In World
Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, ed. P. Horwich, 55-78.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Psillos, Stathis. 1996. Scientific Realism and the “Pessimistic Induction.”
Philosophy of Science 63 (Proceedings): S306-S314.
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers,
vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wray, K. Brad. 2015. Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties. International Studies
in the Philosophy of Science 29(1): 61-73.
Spontaneous Generations 9:1(2018) 145
